

Copied by Elizabeth Powers

~~The Games can have the following functions:~~

- that is, "The Game"
1. Further investigation of the theory, Because its elaboration, like the elaboration of manners, ~~is limited only~~ is limited only by the extent to which the parties perceive these intricate courses to lead to their goal.

2. ~~Investigation of how people learn the game~~

The uncertain and unfortunate scope of the theory.

That people do indeed conform to the entire bargaining model in bargaining is probably true, though certainly not redundant. ~~Thatixix~~

That is: WHERE PRACTICAL and FROM TIME TO TIME, there will be threats, promises, moves to give credit to claims.

It is also clear that there is downright emotional behavior, untinted by strategic considerations.*

/* My enjoyment of, and interest in, this theory makes my area of acceptance for examples of this much smaller than anybody else's. It is for this reason that I put in a statement which others would consider so absurdly obvious./

The question then concerns the middle ground.

It does not concern, I ~~think~~ think, whether the model ever applies in personalized and physiognomic ground.

But rather, where.

Moreover, the psychology of good play does not involve full consideration of things before moving. Again, in chess, the good player is ~~probably~~ not conscious of all the good features of his move, and perhaps ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ he cannot name the features of the board that precipitate it. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

Hence it certainly cannot be a requirement of ~~xxxxxxxx~~ discussion of games that they be "thought out."

It is the same for any system of coming-shortcuts that might lead us to call a thing 'partially thought out.' Or for any system of responsive behavior, regardless of why adopted.

THE FUNCTIONS OF A MOVE are the same* /*barring complexities like the move indicating that the player is aware of something in the situation/ regardless of what the psychology of it was.

Therefore ~~xxxxxxxx~~ examine the situation.

THE GAME IS A SITUATION WITH PROPERTIES

The setting-up of a game with payoffs for certain behaviors is more like a working model to satisfy the patent office than an experiment.

But

There is this purpose: to show that there are clear features of the situation which possess advantage or disadvantage, and which are susceptible to shrewd play for the player's betterment.

But actually the game need never be played for this to be demonstrable; for these features are a priori, and reside merely in the faceless description of the game.
~~Anyway~~

They may be (like the necessary win for one side in chess) logical features distantly removed from the playing of the game-- ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ but, as in chess, there may be no application of these mathematical features for the finite player.

THIS IS AN EXTENSIONAL THEORY, sort of.

If that is so we must distinguish two uses of the game:

1. To make clear-- by actual play if necessary-- what a situation really is.
2. To find out how people act in it. But if we are dealing ~~in~~ with alternatives in which there is a rational course, we want to make sure the subjects see it, ~~in which~~ or else we are just studying whether they see it. (E.g., as a function of personality.) In which case they will Perform the Rational Act. So what?
3. ~~2~~ If there is no rational course, what's the point? To test people's responses to games, again as a personality factor? Certainly not-- ~~xxxxxxxx~~ we want to test the use of certain structural mechanisms by human beings in a complicated field that includes affectual behavior, real or simulated, among its alternatives, ~~when there is the possibility of the rational use.~~ when there is the possibility of the rational use. (And not just as an appealing ~~when there is the possibility of the rational use.~~ or easy move, or as a habit.)

There must
be a rational
move possible.

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on STUDYING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLAYING THE GAME.

We could measure the circumstances under which people learn to play these games best, and conditions that make for the clearest, handiest and most advantageous use of the bargaining-system.

BUT THEN this would degenerate into mere parametric study of game-playing, and not tell us very much about the behaviors we were thinking about before.

Yet such results could be useful if they showed sufficient transfer, that is, if all games-players in certain kinds of games showed certain typical patterns of play, blind spots, and the like. Like VERY SPECIAL RIGIDITIES. Or moves to always make certain things inescapable (like estimation of number of things, e.g. sheep.)

For instance, in ~~in~~ ^{spontaneously} study, it came out that no two players ~~developed~~ the cooperative pattern that two rational players would certainly have worked out beforehand. (What was it? the rational strategy, alternating play?)

N.B. In this experiment, cheating was punishable, if a rational pattern could have been ~~in~~ evolved. No mechanisms of enforcement would have been required on the side, as in the prisoner's dilemma.

If, as in this case, special training is needed to know certain moves, that will be a fact of interest.

(Compare Bruner's old experiment with perception of the ~~value~~ value of coins.

But let us note: this is not a property of the game. This is an ability to see the property of the game, if it has any, which can be trained.

THE ANALOGY WITH COMPUTER SIMULATION.

~~THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF GAME SIMULATION.~~

Game simulation is... and is done by... and we might try it.
The question naturally presents itself to us: What can we learn from game simulation?

Let us examine the obvious analogue, machine simulation, to see what comparisons are strong and which weak.

In computer simulation, a program analogous to the situation results in an analog of the behavior expected or ~~found~~ found. The experimenter then has a good case for saying that something analogous to the internal mechanisms of the program is happening in the world, (although the nature of the analogy cannot be pinpointed. Clearly the millions of additions and subtractions and on-off tests within the computer do not have an analogy-- but the ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ greater dynamics of consideration, ~~xxx~~ sequencing of thoughts, weightings and so forth may well.)

Much of the strength of this technique, however, seems to lie in the demonstrable analogy of output and input. ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ In R.F. Bales' research (current. Personal communication) the inputs are measured by standard devices, ~~like~~ -- personality tests, interaction types and rates, and the like.

This is strong glue, at both ends (input and output) to make the analogy stick.

How establish clear and tangible bases for the analogy here?

The simulation-game imitates a real thing by demonstrating that analogous situations, whose rules and rewards are known, ~~induce~~ entice, compel or otherwise induce analogous behavior.

~~How establish clear and tangible bases for the analogy here?~~


~~However,~~ There exist logical difficulties with trying the same technique here.

MEASUREMENT DISTRICT. The intention is to design games which have ~~ingenious~~ strategic features like those in interpersonal dealings. The measurement of either the player or characteristics of the game-- such as ratios of positive and negative payoff-- would ~~xxxxxxxx~~ turn out attention from its strategic properties. We are not out to find ~~xxxxxxxx~~ utilities, or test a player's likelihood of choosing alternatives as a personality-dependent variable. The question is to see and understand the situation, to learn whether it does indeed have properties that call out certain behaviors from the intelligent actor.

The point is it does if he sees the analogy. But do we have to get him stockshaving?

The Games Themselves

DIFFICULTY: the components can be better described than ~~presented~~ realized. That is, sacrifices in versatility must be made if the principles are to be laid out plain.



A matrix or implicational model could accommodate all of them, and all variant combinations, but this would lose playability ~~and the bird-in-hand quality of~~ and arrestingness, the latter being a good sales-reason for extensional theory.

BEST EVER would be a playing-box, involving (we fear) much circuitry, but reducing control to easily manipulable things and versatile enough that a sophisticated subject can, by familiarity with the machine's range, learn all the games, and (to a certain sharpness) good ways of playing.

Both as Theory and for teaching-principles

This is a theory of how clever people would act if they had no particular feelings, but different wants, and only ~~the~~ physiognomic indicators with which to operate.

It also dictates what range of choice they may have, ^{within} ~~beyond~~ the narrow margin not ~~called for~~ by habit and the life.
laid down

We may also investigate how people learn the game, by showing what small payoff matrices will lead to what behavior on busier later ones.

Second purpose of Ego-tron.

SCHELLING ON PROGRESSIVE, ESCALATED COMMITMENT

(in beginning)

In threat situations, as in ordinary bargaining, commitments are not altogether clear; each party cannot exactly estimate the costs and values to the other side of the two related actions involved in the threat; the process of commitment may be a progressive one, the commitments acquiring their firmness by a sequence of actions."

For threats one may read suggestive actions.

(Schelling, page 39)

SCHELLING on ¹⁾revealing what I want, and ²⁾what's between us.

" The lack of any means of testing the truth is the very basis of that tantalizing game in which each participant attaches positive value to the other's welfare, as when husband and wife discuss whether or not to go to a movie, each wanting to do whatever the other wants to do and wanting to seem to want it himself, knowing that the other is similarly expressing a preference that represents a guess at what one wants to do, etc. There is also an entire domain of game theory involving interpersonal relations in which the overt revelation or recognition of one's value system itself affects values; my awareness that my neighbor does not like me may cause me small discomfort, as does his awareness of my awareness, but if we are forced to accredit the fact overtly, the pain may be ~~awfully acute~~ acute." (115-116)

There are many kinds of cases in which reversals of the perceived interpersonal situation — and switches ~~by~~ of meaning of actions, bargain-actions or any actions — can be affected by either ~~or~~ ^{or both} players

appearing to construe things in a certain way. The reverse behavior ~~causes~~ a lock-on, ~~to great discomfort~~ is the almost irrevocable rigidification of an interpersonal situation by ~~the~~ ^{a very} explicit convergence of communication.

FIVE FAMILIES: Jesús separates himself.

"**J** Jesús had a way of separating himself from people even when he was surrounded by them, as in the busy restaurant, the markets, and in his three crowded households. He had always been a solitary figure, for he distrusted people and did not understand them. He had never had friends, and had alienated even his few relatives. ..." (271)

Best examples: the two fellas J. Sánchez & G. Gutiérrez, each of which seems to be satisfied by a standard set of things no matter what unhappinesses are current in the families. Sánchez is ~~satisfied when~~ comfortable when he is ~~not~~ able to maintain ~~distance~~ psychic distance from people, ~~(271)~~ ~~and or~~ everyone is locked up at home and everything is under his control. Gutiérrez is comfortable when he is busy with a side scheme that seems drafty, no matter how preposterous it is, and no matter how much money they are making otherwise.

The Game is important, strengthened in its own,
because

GIVEN THE PAYOFFS, THIS IS THE
RATIONAL WAY TO ACT.

~~How~~

But whence the payoffs?

Ah — as much from learning

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF BRIDGE-GAMES.

As one bridge to affective behavior, against affective theory?

To better ape this semi-affective behavior.

"The games" have relatively clear alternatives*and no emotional content. To show their ~~xxx~~ real appropriateness for the socio-emotional world is real tricky.

/*as said before, if the alternatives are not clear, it becomes too soon a question of the psychology of ~~the~~ New Abstract Games, their perception,~~xxx~~ analysis and play./

GOING TO THE REAL WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH. For no matter how much emotional behavior you found in what I have called bargaining-situations of socio-emotional behavior, it would still not break my claim that the structure of the game is in some way influencing play.

Note well that there is nothing in-principle immeasurable ~~about whether there is an affectual response in the situations, or what kinds of conceptual behavior is going on. But this is extremely difficult to get at on any subtle level, and it is not likely to yield germane results.~~

If the game is only the theory, then so is a bridge-game only a theory. For that is just slightly more resemblant.

This will ~~be~~ continue to hold no matter how many physiognomic variables we add.

Within the scope of foreseeable research, we cannot get close enough to real life, the limiting case.

But we can improve the analogy, and show the use of ~~physiognomic~~, "affectual" behavior for structuring and signalling.

And we can show that human beings can perceive these features of the games; that the instructions need not make these features ~~crudely obvious~~ ^{features} ~~xxx~~

/*N.B. Some ~~features~~ of rational game-play were not "obvious" till v. Neumann & Morgenstern. Minimax Theorem, e.g.

Some interesting games.

1. Variation of the (?) game.

Idea: it is structurally possible for A to entice B into a cooperative relationship by demonstrating a pattern ~~to which B~~.

B

A { INVISIBLE	0	1	1	0	1
	1	0	1	0	1
VISIBLE	0	1	0	1	0
	0	1	0	0	1

A's signal lights

B's signal lights

The payoffs are not till end of game. A is supposed to get the idea that if he makes all his moves visible, in a simple alternation pattern, ~~catch on~~ reducing the matrix to


	B1	B2
A3	0	1
A4	1	0

B, with any intelligence, should catch on that A is going to give him every other odd one, and cooperate by giving him each even.

Authentication and ^{visibility and} attention.


Where you would have to perform an authenticating move, ^{but can hide not} you may, under suitable motivational conditions, and you are being watched ^[not necessary] and know it and are seen to know it, ^[nor this] you must do so if there is room for doubt.]

SOURCE
OF
VERY
IMP.
GAME.



Examples on this order: clapping pocket conspicuously to show you forgot something when you reverse direction in public, to indicate that you are not following a pretty girl; passing someone who thinks you are following them.

IN WHICH
THE LOGIC
IS THE
CRITICAL
VARIABLE.

VARIABLE-
VISIBILITY
SCORED


ON THE ETIQUETTE OF RESEARCH PROPOSALS

~~Many important findings~~

Many important findings-- let me call them "pattern-findings"-- are things that just turned up in the data, and were not looked for.

It is against the etiquette of the research proposal to say you think they exist, and suggest going to look. Ordinarily a concrete hypothesis is required to be put to test, even though everyone may suspect that the other kind of finding will be the only one of real interest, should it appear.

Similarly, it is improper to propose parametric studies, even though, in a sense, all of science is a ~~parametric~~ study of the universe, and the ~~experimental~~ method is a shortcut way to try to ~~make them~~ find the parameters-- by trying to reduce ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ to disjunctive possibilities,
a question

and finding out which is so. (The question really is whether they are exclusively disjunctive and properly phrased.)

BUT whether it is necessary to make a fourfold disj.? This is crude, and gives evidence that you ~~xxxx~~ are imprinted with the way of thinking, but sincerity ~~and~~ and clearmindedness must prevent anyone from using a technique where he doesn't think it is applicable.


The Game ^{should have its rational strategy;} ~~payoffs~~ should be clear:
for if ~~it is~~ ~~are~~ not clear,

then we are testing how individuals
act in a new ambiguous game-situation.

To learn The Game = (i.e., the theory)

CAN STUDY GAMES OF PARTIAL REVELATION =

On a matrix board:



I think an adequate sketch has been made of how, within the scope of something like Schelling's theory, an extremely wide range of behaviors can be seen to have signal, ^{commitment} payoff and authentication value.

Intrapersonal behavior:

Pricing, priorities ...

Scanning-orders, fulfillment criteria ...

BARGAINING

Cognition

SCHELLING ON MAKING DEMARCATATIONS CLEAR (prob. in my game)
 USE IN DOCTRINE?

" If my neighbor's fruit tree overhangs my yard and I pick exactly all the fruit on my side of the line, my neighbor can probably discern what my "proposal" is, and has a good idea of what he has acquiesced in for the future if he does not retaliate. But if, instead, I pick that same amount of fruit from both sides of the line haphazardly or pick some amount that is related, say, to the size of my family, he is less likely to perceive just what I have in mind. (He may also be more obliged to resist or retaliate if I pick only part of the fruit on my side of the line than if I pick it all, since I have failed to demarcate the limit of my intentions. " (footnote, p. 104)

Schelling on TRAIT COMMITMENT

Man who ties his hands First wins

Tying your hands may be done by a trait you must maintain

" ... The advantage goes to the party that can persuasively point to an array of other negotiations in which its own position would be prejudiced if it made a concession in this one. " (30)

Similarly, long-term dealings with one person:

" The second party is simultaneously the "third party" to whom one's bargaining reputation may be pledged." (30)

Principle

" Principles and Precedents. To be convincing, commitments usually have to be qualitative rather than quantitative, and to rest on some rationale. It may be difficult to conceive of a really firm commitment to \$2.07½; why not \$2.02½? The numerical scale is too continuous to provide good resting ~~px~~ places, except at nice round numbers like \$2.00. But a commitment to the principle... may provide a foothold for a commitment. Furthermore, one may create something of a commitment by putting the principles and precedents themselves in jeopardy. "

(34)

Here is the beginning of a departure,
at least still deep, from the ~~standard~~
game-theoretical setup. For we are
talking about

~~for we notice that~~ physiognomic traits
— characteristics of the human being of (—
become usable as markers in a game.

Because they are sequential, they do not lay out ⁱⁿ ~~for~~
easy matrices, but they should be no less clear ^{for}
~~that~~.

~~TRAIT PLAUSIBILITY~~

~~(Gutierrez)~~

TRAITS THAT REQUIRE RESPONSE TO INSULT.

STAND-TAKING

~~ATTENTION, FORGETFULNESS AS REAL ATTRIBUTES~~
~~USED TO SIGNAL~~

~~(Sánchez sisters.) Take pause.~~

HURT FEELINGS. To briefly characterize:
HURT FEELINGS is when you have no ~~immediate~~ retaliation that wouldn't
make you unhappier than the situation you're in now.
But showing your reaction can be a small retaliation.

SITUATION RIGGING FOR REVELATION OF (FEELINGS etc.)
Hara-kiri as the extreme example.

~~Importance of those being real traits~~ ground which to form
Importance of some moves — use of and accentuation of cues →

Now we turn to another situation in which
~~the important thing is to make~~

commitments of one kind or another are induced
apart, and their exact content is important.

Of these cases the manner of
being induced is of great importance in regard
behaviour of subjects it is special
check over procedure to avoid systematic error.

There is an escape where no reinforcement
are applied to induce unlearned responses,
partial

strategically, to induce certain responses in others.

Now we turn to ~~crude~~ situations in which
~~the ^{most} important thing is to make~~

commitments of one kind or another are valued
especially highly, and their exact content is ~~relevant~~
important.

Self-consciousness: the awareness of
being watched ~~which~~ constrains or guides
behavior, or subjects it to special
check-over procedures to avoid important errors.

Here is an example where no mechanisms
are operating to make embarrassment especially
painful:

lect of

FIVE FAMS: ~~lower class culture, much less~~ stand-taking.

Filched comb example:

"... Galván walked in combing his hair.

Lola pounced on him. "Ay, look, this kid's got my comb!"

"Your comb! That's not so. I just took it away from Jorge in the courtyard."

"No wonder I looked for it and couldn't find it. I left it on top of the TV ~~xxxxx~~ yesterday morning."

Galván threw the comb on the table. "There's your filthy old comb!" he said and walked out.

Lola picked it up. "I'm going to comb Melin's hair. The mirror there is larger than the one here. ..." (201)

(& use earlier token promise)

SPEECH MOVES & DOCTRINE

~~Notes~~

Motivated doctrinal moves, as between
China & Russia, Catholic & Episcopal Churches.

In fact there are no examples in the
Five Families in which precise and literal
commitments are made. But they must be
mentioned.

More on ~~remembering~~ & self-consciousness.

~~As soon as~~

self-consciousness

Under increased memory conditions, where motivations increase, and payoffs go down for

INSULT

GRAND THINKING

We may call this a game. What ~~part~~^{part} A can deny depends on what ~~part~~^{part} B affirms. Payoff depends partly on what sentences we ~~may~~ define as admissible and what relations among them we demand.

Very similar situation if they disagree on some things and we now tell them to maximize agreement-- without retracting their views of disagreement, or retracting as few as possible.

This is a game with a special kind of rule.

**MOW NEW TRAWN THE MURKLE NEW MANS WSAW THE MOF ONZ INEWYMW HEDUWNEW DRUGT NEW MODI
AND WDS GATIN**

MODEL OF THINKING. "Ideas"(undefined) are taken two at a time and compared. There are associated with ideas certain priorities and qualities (both undefined-- but you're to get the general idea.) "Priority" means roughly how important the idea is to you, "quality" ~~may be~~ its truth-value in your system (but granting different conceptual modalities of truth, such as "true," "false," "indeterminate," "silly," "probable...") all comparisons poss-- implies etc

When two of these ideas are compared/~~and~~ there is apparent disagreement between them, you may automatically change the truth-value of one of them, or forget it entirely, or you may start scanning storage for other relevant ideas. Depending on your habits of thought.

THIS IS A GAME. Unlike logic, it's got a payoff, to wit, your general comfort and peace of mind, or whatever reinforcement you're getting.

In this case, you're both the players from the above example-- but you suffer the disadvantage of having to believe whatever you ~~may~~ decide on, so that the ~~more~~ more you care about being right, and the more you know about proper inference, the more safeguards you have to take, more likely you are to

~~two kind commitments~~ try whole restructurings in the face of contradictions.

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SCHELLING ON CASUISTRY

From Schelling (p. 34-35)

" Casuistry. If one reaches the point where concession is advisable, he has to recognize two effects: it puts him closer to his opponent's position, and it affects his opponent's estimate of his firmness. Concession not only may be construed as capitulation, it may mark a prior commitment as a fraud, and make the adversary skeptical of any new pretense at commitment. One, therefore, needs an "excuse" for accomodating his opponent, preferably a rationalized reinterpretation of the original commitment, one that is persuasive to the adversary himself.

More interesting is the use of casuistry to release an opponent from a commitment. If one can demonstrate to an opponent that the latter is not committed, or that he has miscalculated his commitment, one may in fact undo or revise the opponent's commitment. ... when the opponent has resolved to make a moderate concession one may help him by proving that he can make a moderate concession consistent with his former position, and that if he does there are no grounds for believing it to reflect on his original principles. "

The

GAME SIMULATION OF COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR, INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR,
INTRAPERSONAL BEHAVIOR,
~~and SOULFUL PHENOMENA in general.~~

~~training games and~~
Some abstract games as extensional theory; some bridge-games
as connectors.

It is not bad manners to bring your pajamas to a dinner party if you do so clearly by accident or as a side effect ~~and not so you will be asked to~~ ~~so it~~ of some other good cause.

Thus with research proposals, when your proposals are supposed to have been in some way derived from ~~or native~~ to a certain body of data. ~~to happen~~

In this case, I happen to have brought my theory with me. And if it has not been derived from the data, I believe ~~it is~~ ^{I shall have made} a fair lap around the track if it can show its application to that data, and still depart ~~at~~ what I consider a ~~fair~~ ^{proper} tangent. ~~to~~ to propose research.

(introductory crud)

In some ways this is an extremely rational ^{istic} model, though on examination of my idea of cognitive behavior it would be hard to say how.

But Freudians would not recognize ^{as describing some creatures.} it, however, for the present purposes ^{abnormal & everyday psychopathology} ~~Freudian~~ theory and ESP are of equal reference, that is, ~~pro~~ of proven validity in certain cases, but if they apply it's only as even further layers.

This has enough layers already; beginning with a string of ideas, we dip it till it's a very fat candle.

Let us begin by discussing the Schelling theory of
BARGAINING in 2-person non-zero-sum games.

these are situations in which you can ~~behave~~
 both lose or gain.

Theory is that ~~if~~ you need a means of ex-
 pressing preferences and using actual enticements
 and punishments to back them up.

Let us call these "bargaining channels."
 NEXT P. →

Horrible Example: the Castro family. Only actual threat of a
 strapping slows the boys down. There are no
 means of punishing & rewarding on bit-by-bit fronts
 that the boys will appreciate.

	Story	No story
Shooting		
No shooting		

Commit.

	Xmas tree	No Xmas tree
Battery		
Cook		
No		

Commit ✓

Withholding of affection...

The first kind of

Bargaining-channels, ~~in the present context~~, are those which allow for sequential expression of preference and moves. ~~Let us call these~~

[Quotes from Schelling here]
on actions louder than words]

Let us call these, preference-and-punishment ~~to~~ mechanisms — or channels, to suggest a continuity of flow, though not necessarily a permanent patterning.

FIVE FAMILIES: NEED FOR EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL POWER IN THE
FAMILY UNIT.

Isabel Castro is unable to effectively translate sexual non-compliance
into a counter for her husband's neglect.
From Isabel Castro's "thoughts":

"To think that with so much money he is stingy with me! I'll bet he's not like that with his mistress. Fat chance! These damned men refuse their wives what they give their mistresses. ... But I know how to get even with him. When he wants to make up to me I pretend to be asleep and then he's stuck with his desires. And when I let him, I feel no pleasure. It is like holding my nose to take castor oil. I have to get back at him some way. Let him go where he has to pay for it. He only gives me enough for the bare essentials." (319-20)

SCHELLING: ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER.

"... talk is not a substitute for moves. Moves can in some way alter the game, by incurring manifest costs, risks, or a reduced range of subsequent choices; they have an information content, or evidence content, of a different character from that of speech. Talk can be cheap when moves are not (except for the "talk" that takes the form of enforceable threats, promises, commitments, and so forth, and that is to be analyzed under the heading of moves rather than communication anyway.) Mutual accommodation ultimately requires, if the outcome is to be efficient, that the division of gains be in accordance with "comparative advantage"; that is, the things a player concedes should be those that he wants less than the other player, relative to the things he trades for. Each needs, therefore, to communicate his value system with some truth, although each can also gain by deceiving. While one's maneuvers are not unambiguous in their revelation of one's value systems and may even be deliberately deceptive, they nevertheless have an evidential quality that mere speech has not." (117)

SCHELLING on INTERRELATION OF SPEECH AND MOVES.

MERTZ " Furthermore, if there are moves available to the players, so that it is an advantage to get on with the maneuver even while negotiating, and particularly if some maneuvers become visible to the other player only after a game lag, there is no reason to suppose that an instant

" ... If the moves had only symbolic significance, leaving the game irreversibly different from what it was before, and typically also their tactical significance raises them above the level of pure speech even in their communication content. One may say and say that a gun is loaded without being able to prove it until he actually shoots; one may say and say that he considers an area strategically important and not be believed until he incurs expense or risk in its protection. Thus moves can reveal information about a player's value system or about the choices of action available to him; moves can commit him to certain actions when speech often cannot; and moves can often progress at a speed that is determined unilaterally, not dependent on formalities of agreement at a conference." (101-2) (101-2)

FIVE FAMS: token promises do toward one
who can't retaliate.

PUT IN
2 PLACES

Similarly, ~~we see~~ the ineffectiveness of people
who are caught powerless in the circumstances of
the family. They must beg for favors, and cannot complain when
the favors are denied.

"Rufelia stood up slowly. "I'm going to bed now,
Julia. Ay, please let me have a scrap of blanket. That
room is so cold! Man! Toward morning is when I feel
it most. Come over later and throw another blanket over
me. Don't be so mean, daughter."

"Yes, mamacita, I'll send one of the children later."
When Rufelia had gone Julia began to pile the dirty dishes
into a basin. x ..."

(201)

The next ^{channel} bargaining ~~model~~ is that of the commitment. In Schelling's model, the point is to restructure another man's payoff so that his old move the one he would have wanted to make, is now less pleasant. Typically, in the more crystalline example, ~~that moves are accomplished~~ one ~~by~~ demonstrating that ~~the opponent~~ ^{es} he is he has incentive to visit punishment on a misbehaving opponent. But off the matrix, it is necessary only to be convincing at this.

The best example of this is in the Sanchez family. Jesus Sanchez has complete power over ~~his~~ his money and chattels, ~~and his threat~~ ^{constant} ~~is~~ and there lurks always in the background the unstated threat that he will throw out ~~the few~~ ^{wholly credible} members of the family who do not accede to his wishes. Everyone therefore gives in completely.

The only person who does not stand in this fear is his daughter Antonia.

DETERRENCE

FIVE FAM'S:

~~JESUS SANCHEZ has complete power over money and chattels because his threat of throwing out dissidents is so credible.~~

~~Everybody else therefore gotta give in completely.~~

~~(But in my theory doesn't that mean they gt relax better, have less trouble?)~~

~~But ANTONIA need not fear Jesus because her threat of illness, unstated, is so credible. Same thing binds her to her husband, however.~~

" ... Antonia had not feared being punished by her father, for he was afraid of causing one of her attacks. Jesus had beaten her severely because of an earlier affair but he knew that when she quarreled with Francisco or did not see him she stopped eating. He had to yield and consent to their union. " (240)

" For a long time, Antonia had taken for granted everything her father did for her. If he did not satisfy her whims she would grow angry and shout at him. She wanted better clothes than her sisters, and got them. All her sisters were jealous. According to Marta her father let Antonia have her own way in everything. "He loved her best and he gave her the life of a queen. I think it was because he had once abandoned her. She used her illness to frighten my poor father into giving her everything she wanted. Nobody could do anything with her but Francisco. As soon as he came over to grab her she would calm down. She was a first-class bitch." " (243)

But ~~not~~ these things curl around in funny ways. She is bound to her husband by the same mechanism, an implied threat that something will happen to him.

A good threat, to deter or compel, must be creditable. Witness this sequence, ¹⁴ which an ad-hoc threat is challenged by the child and effectively dissipated.

Ad-hoc & incredible steps.

FIVE FAMILIES: temper-times ~~and ad-hoc bargaining~~. Retreat by the mother, because her payoffs are in same pot.

(Isabel, Rolando and Lourdes Castro, in car.)

"What did you say?" his mother asked, ready to flare up again.

"Nothing. I didn't say anything."

"Yes, mamá," said Lourdes. "He was grumbling."

"Shut up, you brat, or I'm going to hit you."

"Look, if you don't keep quiet I'll go home and there'll be no tree or anything." It's up to you." Isabel stopped the car.

"No, mamá," Lourdes said conciliatingly. "We're going to keep quiet, aren't we?" Rolando stubbornly said nothing.

"All right," Isabel said, "I'm telling you. At the first word we'll go home." The children were quiet while she drove through the city's traffic, which was very heavy at this time of day. ~~When she went down with him and with~~

While

~~Here it would seem that Isabel is lacking~~
~~from a threat threat, made explicitly~~
~~that she~~ stopped the car, she did not
carry through the threat nor attempt to
salvage it, which will ^{certainly} undermine her threats
in the future.

FIVE FAMS: Guillermo is such a flappy clown ~~xxx~~ that nobody can take him seriously.

" Guillermo had put on his hat, lifted the heavy sack of bottles over his shoulder, and was ready to go out. "I'm going ~~to~~ to deliver this," he said to his wife, "because if I don't go now then maybe tomorrow she won't want it. You know, a sale can't be made just any time from one minute to another. If this bunch is sold then I can begin to make that lottery game and then you'll see how the money rolls in! Damned if I won't rake in the wool!"

Julia was whispering with Yolanda and didn't answer. Guillermo went a little closer to them and raised his voice, "I told you something. If you don't want to believe me, then don't believe me." The women went on talking and Guillermo tried to hear what they were saying. ... " (195)

It is impossible to have a bargaining-personality of any strength when you are so clearly distractable from ~~any~~ a pompous thing you do; at least within the spectrum of known usual personalities, it would be an unlikely expectation to form.

However, this is a specific statement contingent less on the form of the game than of special applications of it to the usual run of people and situations in which ~~xxxx~~ particulars we do not wish to become absorbed.

Let us note how the curious position of
~~offensive~~ ^{emotional} behavior. the "emotional" act
— fist slammed on table, scream, etc. —
can serve ^{quite} ~~as~~ well to authenticate
a threat. ~~as well~~

FIVE FAMS: FORGIVENESS THROUGH FORGETFULNESS.

Consuelo's

Consuelo forgives Antonia. / Adolescence full of jealousy, 249.

"They hadn't often gone anywhere together for their present friendship was recent." (248)

the theory that has been presented
let me recapitulate ~~what I have said so far, or~~

~~so far.~~ For best accommodation between people,
bargaining channels are needed so that each may keep
his fellows in check. These channels provide oppor-
tunity for preference signals, some encouragement ^{and}
~~and~~ punishment, on a non-verbal level. In addition,
bargaining also ^{needs} ~~requires~~ commitment, in which an
individual can mortgage his reputation, ^{tie his own hands,} narrow his
control; ... in various ways gain control of the competitive
situation and dictate the outcome. These commitments,
~~are~~ of people and seen by people, enable a greater
firmness and bargaining strength than is otherwise
possible, ~~at the~~ at the cost of some freedoms.

~~Other human traits may~~

Human traits may take on ~~the~~ extra signal-
value, ~~that they would not have for people who~~
The expression of emotion, many other actions
may come to take on a strategic or ~~tactical~~
tactical aspect at a new level. ~~This extent~~
Hurt feelings, rigging of the situation. forgetting
and remembering.

NEXT

SECTION

REMEMBERING thickens the pile considerably

NEXT

SECTION

Probably not using.

This is a theory about SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

There can be two watchers in self-consciousness: yourself, and another. If nobody's watching you except yourself, that's different from when somebody else is too.

A very long list ~~now~~ can be made of things which you may or may (not) want to reveal. Such as:

PAYOFFS

TRAITS

MOTIVES, CONSIDERATION-BASE... INTENTION !

REACTIONS

Possessions, relations, abilities... ('environmental'; that is, sort of out of the game.)

LIKE A COMPUTER PROGRAM in that no part of your world is not open to scrutiny in the game, just as ~~no part of the computer~~ all information in the computer may be manipulated.

The nature of secrecy and accidental revelation is very tricky. once it becomes clear that you are hiding something, this fact -- even if it does not fully reveal what you are hiding -- indicates that you are motivated to ~~hide something~~ ^{hide something} that a negative payoff could be involved somewhere...

Hence the structure of the situation-- what things are naturally visible-- becomes extremely important for the things it naturally hides and brings to light.

ATTENTION as a fact about human functioning, and CONSIDERATION ditto, also may be used as parts of the game, because they are known to have certain properties.

(Ftnt. HOWEVER, they may be removed from the game by organization, too. This if you make it mandatory that certain things be ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{to} given attention, as (in an organization) by punishing when not, or (in conversation, etc.) ~~xxxxxxx~~ demanding acknowledgement, or (as in a magic show) making them conspicuous in retrospect, so the beholder cannot say to himself, "It must have been thus-and-such, because I wasn't watching that"-- this theory is implausible if you did look in the hat before the rabbit appeared, and so this cause of the magician's trick is ruled out. In just the same way we manipulate interpretations of our actions by manipulating the attentions of the beholder-- though subtlety ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ may count more, since we may not, like the magician, seek to prevent understanding, but rather to force an interpretation, the way he forces a card.)

NOPs

The Logic-program.

Thinking does not always proceed logically, or in a way that can be expressed by the usual logical notations. Hence we ask: is there a representation we can make of the contents of thought?

~~I~~ will talk here of 'ideas,' by that term comprehending everything from ~~image~~ attitudes to Boolean propositions.

~~I think so, and I ought to have the following properties.~~

If so, the system ought to be able to cover the following.

a) A large
1. ~~the whole~~ range of precision, from perhaps the roughest outline presentation of an image or ^{felt} connection to a finely honed philosophical argument.

2. ~~change of explicitness~~
The ~~explicit~~ vague can become explicit and vice versa, as when an ~~open~~ attitude becomes an opinion, or an opinion loses sharpness and colors others.

2. ~~Other~~ changes

3. INCONSISTENCIES CAN BE CORRECTED.

A. They may not be noticed

~~B. The content of a be~~

NO p

ATTENTION & CONSIDERATION
operationally defined

~~Assoc~~

Locate

~~Correspond~~

Distinguish Deny

Generalize

ATTENTION

SELF CONSCIOUSNESS

without which can't have

REASONING

COMMITMENT

The STRATEGICS of SECRECY are hence ~~more~~ complicated.

Given a secret, A.

Not only may you wish it to be a secret. You may also want

"A is a secret" to be a secret.

You may wish to reveal something, and have it seem to be accidentally revealed.

The possibility of ACCIDENTAL REVELATION must therefore exist, (*or you must believe the other fellow believes it exists.)

STAND-TAKING

↑ only imp. when ~~the~~ ATTENTION.

CONSISTENCY → EXPLANATION

TRAIT " → APPARENT expl.

SCHELLING-GAME

"Neither player knows the other player's value system-- or perhaps knows just a little about it, such as what elements matter but not how much they matter. Each must learn what he can about the other's value system by observing the other player's moves." 91 (103)






HE SAYS HIS GAME WORKS THIS WAY:

"Now how do the players 'bargain' in this game? One way or another, they do in fact make proposals and counterproposals; they accept, reject, retaliate, and even discover ways of conveying threats and promises. ..."

WE SEEM TO "JUSTIFY" WHAT WE LIKE TO DO ANYWAY.

" Guillermo sat up to dress. He was wearing a soiled T shirt and shorts made of coarse sacking. Over these he pulled on a pair of thoroughly dirty cotton trousers and then pushed his feet into his old shoes. He never tied his shoelaces, even when he wore his better pair downtown, because he believed his shoes lasted longer this way. "If I tie them they get tight and then when I sit down the shoes bust on me." Sometimes Julia complained of his unshaven, disheveled appearance and ragged clothing, but he would answer that it was better to go about looking poor so that people would repay what they owed him. " (138)

ABSTRACT DOCTRINE GAME I




ABSTRACT DOCTRINE GAME II

Ⓐ Ⓑ Ⓒ Ⓓ Ⓔ Ⓕ ... (scrabble &)
(has both numbers and letters)

ABSTRACT DOCTRINE GAME III

COLORS MARKERS. YOU CAN PUT ON
OR TAKE OFF. IDEA IS

TO FOOL
GUY
AS TO
WHERE
YOU'RE
PUTTING
THINGS.



ABSTRACT DOCTRINE IV

Schelling-game ~~is~~ (let 'punishment' be
'contradiction?')



ABSTRACTION ~~area~~. SOMEHOW.

Permits you to come back to the old game
with a conspicuously ~~CHANGED~~ FRAME OF
REFERENCE, and BREAK DOCTRINAL BIND.

DOCTRINE - GAME, V

~~Either the twags are all spingrid,~~
~~or they are not.~~
~~No twags are spingrid~~
...
elfin

Are nymphs elves?

Trolls, satyrs, gnomes, leprechauns, norns,
witches, fairies,

Other (unused) categories.

MUST NAME ALL THE CATEGORIES & ADJS.
BEFOREHAND.

Schelling Theory

Payoffs, revelation.

Threat etc. as combination - bargaining

STRUCTURED SITUATIONS are the thing to satisfy/dissatisfy

everybody.
CONSPICUOUS SOLUTIONS, conjunct games...

My additions =

these are how people behave interpersonally.

+ For self-conscious ^{explicit} people
Cognitive behavior is another aspect of it; and varies
from complete 'integrity' to 'subjugation' to motives (etc.)

Distraction & ~~reorientation~~ attentional behavior &
shifts of emphasis permit enormous reorientation
of the situation. ~~only extra-consideration~~

~~keeps the situation from degenerating (etc.)~~
~~so that you don't accidentally lose ground.~~

Extra-consideration must be constantly applied
to prevent this, when possible (as to keep
new-choices transitive.)

Payoff from liquidity of situation may keep altering from
troubling on you thus.

The ^{interpersonal} ~~see~~ manifold has few pure cases, without doctrine. Fights & games, usually; Challenges & market behavior. ^(But that's not exactly 'interpersonal') Action & payoff; strict game theory; v.N. & M., Schelling.

But where any ~~statement~~ statements or generalities are implied or suggested — for instance, by "I love you" — then it's a new case.

The other pure case is just as rare. It is approached by philosophers etc. This is 'doctrine.' I don't know why.
DOCTRINE OVERT, COGNITION PRIVATE.


THIS DOMAIN IS THE GAME - ~~DOCTRINE~~ ^{COGNITION} DOMAIN.

^{ONE} UNIQUE PROPERTY: Actions, suggest, confirm & disconfirm cognitive stuff. & other human revelations

INTERESTING GAME

Three-person game, illustrating a situational
bind, of a kind.

A and B are dickering but C is watching.
Analogue: flirting in front of your wife
in ways she can see, and in
ways she can't.



Moral: if there's a way to prove accession, you'll accede - otherwise not (Schelling)

Hypothesis: That most of "the bottom" of the "iceberg" is for the cutting up or destruction of circ. mechanisms.

PSYCHOLOGY OF ACADEMIC PERSUASION

It is possible that the description of the game has some plausibility to a new audience, i.e., it points up things that have not been thought of before.

However, this is not much different from other common-sense grounds which generally present ~~themselves~~ themselves for theory.

someone

Like ~~a small boy~~ *someone* who had seen many people playing Parcheesi in his life, but only just now come to understand the game.

The hardbitten academic consumer looks for more, though. Either typical signs, ~~or~~ like statistics of validation, or some compelling evidence.

QUICK RUNDOWN OF THE SCHELLING*THEORY I'M PRESENTING. AND MY PHYSIOGNOMIC ADDITIONS.

Through ~~the various~~ there being different people,
there are different interests.

Through

To handle these interests there are many devices.
(Excluding altruisms etc., which are far too complicated to
mention.) EXPRESSION OF PREFERENCES, THREATS, PROMISES, ETC.

For there to be rational ~~acceptance~~ acceptance of these, there
must be AUTHENTICATION.

Authentication depends on the properties of the systems
used. In military science, for instance, a country that
seeks to make its attack systems convincing will show the
decision-processes and mechanisms it possesses clearly.
Assuming that it has the hardware it wants to seem to have.

It might be, on the other hand, that it has to fake.
Okay.

Point is that I want to say these things take place
in everyday life to an extent unsuspected. ~~and~~

They must use other channels than mere words. Threats
lose their ring quickly by being mildly tested and found
untrue, same with promises, etc.

THEORY

Man does not live by words alone, or love, etc. It
gotta be through large number of ~~xxx~~ communications and
punishment-reward tricks, to keep others in line and informed
as to your needs on a subtle level.

MUST BE COMBINATION OF ACTS AND WORDS.

Having "acts" has a further set of functions:

1. DISJUNCTIVE INTERPRETATION-- can fudge, act as if that's
not what was meant.
2. Locked onto the nature of human reactions ~~xxx~~ of the naive
level-- they have to be real in some sense, nearly always.

*This is the
scope of
generalized
bargain theory.*

THE PAPER AS SHE WILL BE WROTE.

DOCTRINE
INTERPERSONAL BARGAINING/AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS:
A proposal for simulation-games and bridge-games.

"FIVE FAMILIES" PART
THEORY PART:

Bargaining takes place between people. Schelling theory will be used.

(OMITTED: considerations of trait consistency. OAM of cue satisfaction. INTRAPERSONAL bargaining in cognition and emotional commitment. Intrapersonal doctrino-emotional problems: apathy, existentialist bind. Attention and cognition as shifting the bargain-board.)

Schelling:

Moves on all fronts: the mixture of games, hitting one another.
Undependability of words, use of action to show payoff.
Variation of communication channels determining possibilities.
Conspicuousness of solutions as helping ~~xxxxxxx~~ determine them.
Commitment as side-bet, or anyhow a deal in which you're made to keep coming.

Nelson:

Doctrinal (stated, not what you really think, but what you say)
moves are also moves.

BINDS. ~~xxxxxxx~~ simple commitmental, doctrinal.

THE TEACHER who keeps certain channels open and forces compliance.
Likewise Communist Chinese, in their prison camps.

THE GAMES

THE BRIDGE-GAMES

CURIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY of the bridge-games.

Other things:

BE CERTAIN TO USE THE BRUNER-GAME.

Outline

Five Families as a springboard.

Outright bargaining Ineffectiveness for Castros: money, sex.

Appendix
THE
SRC
GAME

The Theory.

~~Bargaining & self~~
Conceptual thinking (selfconscious)
Self-revelation. ^{PRATTS} Commitment: Choices, gratifications..
~~Doctrinal~~ ^{MOTIVES, GRATIFICATIONS.} Commitment Binds: Doctrinal ^{UNIMPORTANT} ~~Contractual~~ ^{PROMISE}
~~Emotional~~, Doctrino-Emotional.

Preface to the games. On extensional Theory & bridge-games.

The Games.

THE BRIDGE GAMES. Scripts: seduction,
doctrinal ^{split w. subsequent} merging (CAN BE DONE PARTLY WITH PRINTED SLIPS.)
Deciding to like Picasso.

Other possible metrics of game-moves. Do they come naturally? 'Acculturation bind' — maybe club membership + previous national pride ... kids' experiment, ~~valentine~~ day: have ~~play~~ phony party for phony holiday, which involves kissing-games & doctrine & adults' listening to doctrine (plus kids' embarrassment ~~over~~ but eagerness to kiss.) Ambiguous rules subject to varying interpretation. Bargaining.

APPENDICES.

1. Conceptual thinking
2. Internal accounting
3. The ~~Great Game (?)~~ SRC game.

Schelling

GAMES, BARGAINING, TOPOGRAPHY (consciousness),
SITUATIONS STRUCTURE (rearrangement of payoffs), DANGERS
(most man; punishment by danger.)
COMMITMENT.

Nelson.
Cognitive
ops.

IDEAS, PROPOSITIONS, WAYS OF MAKING THEM
COME OUT SOME SPECIAL WAY. (in payoff situations.)

Nelson.

BOTH COMBINED. Doctrinal commitment.
Doctrinal differentiation, reconciliation. Doctrinal moves
& bring payoff, both in the one-person and two person
situation. Doctrinal presents

Mother

Fucker.

Schelling
interpersonally

All moves (+ THEIR COGNITIVE IMPLICATIONS) at once*
take on significance re consideration, attention, prospect
characteristics of the actors. 'INCIDENTALS' of world & situation.
THIS IS THE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF MAKING SCHELLING INTERPERSONAL.
*given self-consciousness and attentiveness to this sort of thing.

THIS WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR MANY CASES.

But must add now

DOCTRINE + INTERPERSONAL.

Postulates of emotional commitment.

1) Harder you work, more you'll want it (etc.) 2) In far case, you control this directly.

BALL GAME.

FIVE FAMILIES: VALUE OF SIGNAL CONSISTENCY

Jesus Sánchez always knocks three times. Shows one function of his stern regularity.

" A second time that day they heard three knocks on the front door and again Lupita recognized them and went quickly to open the door without pausing to ask who was there. She slid back the bolt and Jesus walked in. " (281)

- ✓ **BARGAINING-CHANNELS.** Only strap works.
~~withdrawing of affection~~
- ✓ **DETERRENCE & THREAT.** The Castros. That mother who's cold.
Sánchez home.
- ✓ **TRAIT PLAUSIBILITY.** Guillermo Gutierrez.

SELFCONSCIOUSNESS: HOW IMPORTANT IS COMMITMENT?
Comb (Gutierrez)

- ✓ ATTENTION, FORGETFULNESS AS ~~USED~~ REAL ATTRIBUTES
USED TO SIGNAL.
(Sánchez sisters.) (* token promise)

Commitment
by words

- SPEECH ↔ MOVES
- INSULT & forced response
- ~~Situational~~ rigging to avoid commitments... (avoid duel...)
- Doctrinal argument

INTERNAL ACCOUNTING & PROCEDURE Jesús Sánchez.

If affection etc. are not part of internal-accounting system,
then the subtlety of bargain-channels that involve affection
and sense of psychic withdrawal have no effect, &
others must be used. (Castros.)

DOCTRINAL reprisal, involving internal stuff.

COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR as successive comparisons, whose outcome
is motivated, and all parts of which are very flexible.
INTERNAL BARGAINING - everyday examples... Self-justification (Guillermo)

FALLING IN LOVE...

TEMPTATION

GRATIFICATIONAL COMMITMENT

EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT

EXISTENTIALISM.

SOULFUL: DOCTRINE-EMOTIONAL
STUFF AND

PROPOSALS NOT BEING MADE

BECAUSE: 1) I want most global
2) I wanna get at features of game.

GAMES.
What they'd show?
egotism; physiological.

BRIDGE-GAME

Objectivity reduces by abstraction.

BARG
FIVE FAMS: A "tantrum" as expression & registration of offense without harmful consequences. #2

Antonia spoke up, "Why don't you give some to me?"
"Oh, take it, take it, child! Caray!" Marielena said angrily. "Tonia you are like a schoolgirl. Everything is a joke to you, and no one knows when you're serious."
"Oh, you bitter child!" Antonia answered. "What do you know about life?"

CHALLENGE & RESPONSE.

Can have model that's strictly categorical,
wherein you commit yourself automatically
to future traits.

~~Can have~~

Next layer: where these commitments are
themselves objects of ~~self~~ scrutiny,
and hence the self-consciousness
~~builds~~ ^{is what makes} the commitment.

~~The Games can have the following functions:~~
that is, "The Game."

1. Further investigation of the theory, Because its elaboration, like the elaboration of manners, ~~is limited only~~ is limited only by the extent to which the parties perceive these intricate courses to lead to their goal.

2. ~~Investigation of how people learn the game~~

The uncertain and unfortunate scope of the theory.

That people do indeed conform to the entire bargaining model in bargaining is probably true, though certainly not redundant. ~~Thaxtix~~

That is: WHERE PRACTICAL and FROM TIME TO TIME, there will be threats, promises, moves to give credit to claims.

It is also clear that there is downright emotional behavior, untinted by strategic considerations.*

/* My enjoyment of, and interest in, this theory makes my area of acceptance for examples of this much smaller than anybody else's. It is for this reason that I put in a statement which others would consider so absurdly obvious./

The question then concerns the middle ground.

It does not concern, I ~~think~~ think, whether the model ever applies in personalized and physiognomic ground. But rather, where.

Moreover, the psychology of good play does not involve full consideration of things before moving. Again, in chess, the good player is ~~probably~~ not conscious of all the good features of his move, and perhaps ~~when he moves he cannot name the features of the board that precipitate it.~~
coming shortcuts

Hence it certainly cannot be a requirement of ~~discussion of~~ games that they be "thought out."

It is the same for any system of coming-shortcuts that might lead us to call a thing 'partially thought out.' Or for any system of responsive behavior, regardless of why adopted.

THE FUNCTIONS OF A MOVE are the same* /*barring complexities like the moves indicating that the player is aware of something in the situation/ regardless of what the psychology of it was.

Therefore ~~examine~~ examine the situation.

THE GAME IS A SITUATION WITH PROPERTIES

The setting-up of a game with payoffs for certain behaviors is more like a working model to satisfy the patent office than an experiment.

But

There is this purpose: to show that there are clear features of the situation which possess advantage or disadvantage, and which are susceptible to shrewd play for the player's betterment.

But actually the game need never be played for this to be demonstrable; for these features are a priori, and reside merely in the faceless description of the game.

They may be (like the necessary win for one side in chess) logical features distantly removed from the playing of the game-- ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ but, as in chess, there may be no application of these mathematical features for the finite player.

THIS IS AN EXTENSIONAL THEORY, sort of.

If that is so we must distinguish two uses of the game:

1. To make clear-- by actual play if necessary-- what a situation really is.
2. To find out how people act in it. But if we are dealing ~~in~~ with alternatives in which there is a rational course, we want to make sure the subjects see it, ~~xxxxxxx~~ or else we are just studying whether they see it. (E.g., as a function of personality.) In which case they will Perform the Rational Act. So what?
3. ~~2~~ If there is no rational course, what's the point? To test people's responses to games, again as a personality factor? Certainly not-- ~~xxxxxxxx~~ we want to test the use of certain structural mechanisms by human beings in a complicated field that includes affectual behavior, real or simulated, among its alternatives, ~~whenever would whenever~~ when there is the possibility of the rational use. (And not just as an appealing ~~xxxxxxxx~~ or easy move, or as a habit.)

There must
be a rational
move possible.

on STUDYING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PLAYING THE GAME.

We could measure the circumstances under which people learn to play these games best, and conditions that make for the clearest, handiest and most advantageous use of the bargaining-system.

BUT THEN this would degenerate into mere parametric study of game-playing, and not tell us very much about the behaviors we were thinking about before.

Yet such results could be useful if they showed sufficient transfer, that is, if all games-players in certain kinds of games showed certain typical patterns of play, blind spots, and the like. Like VERY SPECIAL RIGIDITIES. Or moves to always make certain things incalculable (like estimation of numbers of things, e.g. sheep.)

For instance, in a study, it came out that no two players ~~spontaneously~~ developed the cooperative pattern that two rational players would certainly have worked out beforehand. (What was it, the rational strategy, alternating play?)

N.B. In this experiment, cheating was punishable, if a rational pattern could have been ~~in~~ evolved. No mechanisms of enforcement would have been required on the side, as in the prisoner's dilemma.

If, as in this case, special training is needed to know certain moves, that will be a fact of interest.

(Compare Bruner's old experiment with perception of the ~~value~~ value of coins.

But let us note: this is not a property of the game. This is an ability to see the property of the game, if it has any, which can be trained.

THE ANALOGY WITH COMPUTER SIMULATION.

~~THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF GAME SIMULATION.~~

Game simulation is... and is done by... and we might try it.
The question naturally presents itself to us: What can we learn from game simulation?

Let us examine the obvious analogue, machine simulation, to see what comparisons are strong and which weak.

In computer simulation, a program analogous to the situation results in an analog of the behavior expected or ~~found~~ found. The experimenter then has a good case for saying that something analogous to the internal mechanisms of the program is happening in the world, (although the nature of the analogy cannot be pinpointed. Clearly the millions of additions and subtractions and on-off tests within the computer do not have an analogy-- but the ~~unwieldy~~ greater dynamics of consideration, ~~precise~~ sequencing of thoughts, weightings and so forth may well.)

Much of the strength of this technique, however, seems to lie in the demonstrable analogy of output and input. ~~The input is measured by standard devices, like~~ In R.F. Bales' research (current. Personal communication) the inputs are measured by standard devices, ~~like~~ -- personality tests, interaction types and rates, and the like.

This is strong glue, at both ends (input and output) to make the analogy stick.

How establish clear and tangible bases for the analogy here?

The simulation-game imitates a real thing by demonstrating that analogous situations, whose rules and rewards are known, ~~induce~~ entice, compel or otherwise induce analogous behavior.

~~How establish clear and tangible bases for the analogy here?~~

~~However,~~ There exist logical difficulties with trying the same technique here.

MEASUREMENT DISTRACT. The intention is to design games which have ~~ingenious~~ strategic features like those in interpersonal dealings. The measurement of either the player or characteristics of the game-- such as ratios of positive and negative payoff-- would ~~distract~~ turn our attention from its strategic properties. We are not out to find ~~utilities~~ utilities, or test a player's likelihood of choosing alternatives as a personality-dependent variable. The question is to see and understand the situation, to learn whether it does indeed have properties that call out certain behaviors from the intelligent actor.

The point is it does if he sees the analogy. But do we have to get Stockhausen?

The Games Themselves

DIFFICULTY: the components can be better described than ~~most~~ realized. That is, sacrifices in versatility must be made if the principles are to be laid out plain.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

A matrix or implicational model could accommodate all of them, and all variant combinations, but this would lose playability ~~and the bird-in-hand quality of~~ and arrestingness, the latter being a good sales-reason for extensional theory.

BEST EVER would be a playing-box, involving (we fear) much circuitry, but reducing control to easily manipulable things and versatile enough that a sophisticated subject can, by familiarity with the machine's range, learn all the games, and (to a certain sharpness) good ways of playing.

Both as Theory and for teaching-principles

This is a theory of how clever people would act if they had no particular feelings, but different wants, and only ~~the~~ physiognomic indicators with which to operate.

It also dictates what range of choice they may have, ^{within} ~~beyond~~ the narrow margin not ~~called for~~ by habit and the life.
laid down

We may also investigate how people learn the game, by showing what small payoff matrices will lead to what behavior on busier later ones.

Second purpose of Egoism.

SCHELLING ON PROGRESSIVE, ESCALATED COMMITMENT

(in beginning)

"

In threat situations, as in ordinary bargaining, commitments are not altogether clear; each party cannot exactly estimate the costs and values to the other side of the two related actions involved in the threat; the process of commitment may be a progressive one, the commitments acquiring their firmness by a sequence of actions."

For threats one may read suggestive actions.

(Schelling, page 39)

SCHELLING on ¹⁾revealing what I want, and ²⁾what's between us.

" The lack of any means of testing the truth is the very basis of that tantalizing game in which each participant attaches positive value to the other's welfare, as when husband and wife discuss whether or not to go to a movie, each wanting to do whatever the other wants to do and wanting to seem to want it himself, knowing that the other is similarly expressing a preference that represents a guess at what one wants to do, etc. There is also an entire domain of game theory involving interpersonal relations in which the overt revelation or recognition of one's value system itself affects values; my awareness that my neighbor does not like me may cause me small discomfort, as does his awareness of my awareness, but if we are forced to accredit the fact overtly, the pain may be ~~awwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwww~~ acute. ..." (115-116)

There are many kinds of cases in which reversals of the perceived interpersonal situation — and switches ~~by~~ of meaning of actions, bargain-actions or any actions — can be affected by either ^{or} ~~or both~~ players

appearing to construe things in a certain way. The reverse behavior ~~cause~~ a lock-on, ~~to great discomfort~~ is the almost irrevocable rigidification of an interpersonal situation by ~~the~~ a ^{very} explicit convergence of communication.

FIVE FAMILIES: Jesús separates himself.

"**E** Jesús had a way of separating himself from people even when he was surrounded by them, as in the busy restaurant, the markets, and in his three crowded households. He had always been a solitary figure, for he distrusted people and did not understand them. He had never had friends, and had alienated even his few relatives. ..." (271)

Best examples: the two fellows J. Sánchez & G. Gutiérrez each of which seems to be satisfied by a standard set of things no matter what unhappinesses are current in the families. Sánchez is ~~satisfied when~~ comfortable when he is ~~not~~ able to maintain ~~distance~~ psychic distance from people, ~~(271)~~ ~~and or~~ everyone is locked up at home and everything is under his control. Gutiérrez is comfortable when he is busy with a side scheme that seems drafty, no matter how preposterous it is, and no matter how much money they are making otherwise.

The Game is important, strengthened in its own,
because

GIVEN THE PAYOFFS, THIS IS THE
RATIONAL WAY TO ACT.

~~Hence~~

But whence the payoffs?

Ah — as much from learning

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF BRIDGE-GAMES.

As one bridge to affective behavior, against affective theory?

To better ape this semi-affective behavior.

"The games" have relatively clear alternatives*and no emotional content. To show their ~~xxx~~ real appropriateness for the socio-emotional world is real tricky.

/*as said before, if the alternatives are not clear, it becomes too soon a question of the psychology of ~~the~~ New Abstract Games, their perception,~~xxx~~ analysis and play./

GOING TO THE REAL WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH. For no matter how much emotional behavior you found in what I have called bargaining-situations of socio-emotional behavior, it would still not break my claim that the structure of the game is in some way influencing play.

Note well that there is nothing in-principle immeasurable ~~about whether there is an affectual response in the situations, or what kinds of conceptual behavior is going on.~~ But this is extremely difficult to get at on any subtle level, and it is not likely to yield germane results.

If the game is only the theory, then so is a bridge-game only a theory. For that is just slightly more resemblant.

This will ~~be~~ continue to hold no matter how many physiognomic variables we add.

Within the scope of foreseeable research, we cannot get close enough to real life, the limiting case.

But we can improve the analogy, and show the use of ¹ physiognomic, "affectual" behavior for structuring and signalling.

And we can show that human beings can perceive these features of the games; that the instructions need not make these features crudely obvious*~~xxx~~

/*N.B. Some ~~inner~~ features of rational game-play were not "obvious" till v. Neumann & Morgenstern. *Minimax Theorem, e.g.*

Some interesting games.

1. Variation of the (?) game.

Idea: it is structurally possible for A to entice B into a cooperative relationship by demonstrating a pattern ~~to which B~~.

		B			
A	INVISIBLE	0	1	1	0
		1	0	1	0
	VISIBLE	0	1		0
			0	1	0

A's signal lights

B's signal lights

The payoffs are not till end of game. A is supposed to get the idea that if he makes all his moves visible, in a simple alternation pattern, ~~catch on~~ reducing the matrix to


		B1	B2
A3	0	1	0
A4	0	1	0

B, with any intelligence, should catch on that A is going to give him every other odd one, and cooperate by giving him cash even.

visibility and Authentication and attention.

Where you would have to perform an authenticating move, ^{but can hide not,} you may, under suitable motivational conditions, and you are being watched [and ^{not necessary} know it and are seen to know it], ^[nor this] you must do so if there is room for doubt.]

SOURCE
OF
VERY
IMP.
GAME.



Examples on this order: clapping pocket conspicuously to show you forgot something when you reverse direction in public, to indicate that you are not following a pretty girl; passing someone who thinks you are following them.

IN WHICH
THE LOGIC
IS THE
CRITICAL
VARIABLE.

VARIABLE-
VISIBILITY
SCORED

ON THE ETIQUETTE OF RESEARCH PROPOSALS

~~Many important findings~~

Many important findings-- let me call them "pattern-findings"-- are things that just turned up in the data, and were not looked for.

It is against the etiquette of the research proposal to say you think they exist, and suggest going to look. Ordinarily a concrete hypothesis is required to be put to test, even though everyone may suspect that the other kind of finding will be the only one of real interest, should it appear.

Similarly, it is improper to propose parametric studies, even though, in a sense, all of science is a ~~parametric~~ study of the universe, and the ~~experimental~~ method is a shortcut way to try to ~~make them~~ find the parameters-- by trying to reduce ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ to disjunctive possibilities,
 a question and finding out which is so. (The question really is whether they are exclusively disjunctive and properly phrased.)

BUT whether it is necessary to make a fourfold disj.? This is crude, and gives evidence that you ~~have~~ are imprinted with the way of thinking, but sincerity ~~and~~ and clearmindedness must prevent anyone from using a technique where he doesn't think it is applicable.

The Game ^{should have its rational strategy;} ~~payoffs~~ should be clear:
for if ~~they~~ ~~are~~ not clear,
it is

then we are testing how individuals
act in a new ambiguous game-situation.

To learn The Game = (i.e., the theory)

CAN STUDY GAMES OF PARTIAL REVELATION:

On a matrix board:

I think an adequate sketch has been made of how, within the scope of something like Schelling's theory, an extremely wide range of behaviors can be seen to have signal, ^{commitment}, payoff and authentication value.

Intrapersonal behavior:

Pricing, priorities ...

Scanning-orders, fulfillment criteria ...

BARGAINING

Cognition

SCHELLING ON MAKING DEMARCATATIONS CLEAR (prob. in my game)

USE IN DOCTRINE?

" If my neighbor's fruit tree overhangs my yard and I pick exactly all the fruit on my side of the line, my neighbor can probably discern what my "proposal" is, and has a good idea of what he has acquiesced in for the future if he does not retaliate. But if, instead, I pick that same amount of fruit from both sides of the line haphazardly or pick some amount that is related, say, to the size of my family, he is less likely to perceive just what I have in mind. (He may also be more obliged to resist or retaliate if I pick only part of the fruit on my side of the line than if I pick it all, since I have failed to demarcate the limit of my intentions. " (footnote, p. 104)

Schelling on TRAIT COMMITMENT

Man who ties his hands first wins
 Tying your hands may be done by a trait you must maintain

" ... The advantage goes to the party that can persuasively point to an array of other negotiations in which its own position would be prejudiced if it made a concession in this one. " (30)

Similarly, long-term dealings with one person:
 " The second party is simultaneously the "third party" to whom one's bargaining reputation may be pledged." (30)

Principle

" Principles and Precedents. To be convincing, commitments usually have to be qualitative rather than quantitative, and to rest on some rationale. It may be difficult to conceive of a really firm commitment to \$2.07½; why not \$2.02½? The numerical scale is too continuous to provide good resting ~~px~~ places, except at nice round numbers like \$2.00. But a commitment to the principle... may provide a foothold for a commitment. Furthermore, one may create something of a commitment by putting the principles and precedents themselves in jeopardy. "

(34)

Here is the beginning of a departure,
at least still deep, from the ~~standard~~
game-theoretical setup. For we are
talking about

~~for we notice that~~ physiognomic traits
— characteristics of the human being etc. —
become usable as markers in a game.

Because they are sequential, they do not lay out ⁱⁿ for
easy matrices, but they should be no less clear ^{for}
that.

~~TRAIT PLAUSIBILITY~~

~~(Gutierrez)~~

TRAITS THAT REQUIRE RESPONSE TO INSULT.

STAND-TAKING

~~ATTENTION, FORGETFULNESS AS REAL ATTRIBUTES~~
~~USED TO SIGNAL~~

~~(Sánchez sisters.) Take promise.~~

HURT FEELINGS. To briefly characterize:
HURT FEELINGS is when you have no ~~instant~~ retaliation that wouldn't
make you unhappier than the situation you're in now.
But showing your reaction can be a small retaliation.

SITUATION RIGGING FOR REVELATION OF (FEELINGS etc.)
Hara-kiri as the extreme example.

~~Importance of those being real traits~~ around which to form
Importance of game-moves — use ~~of~~ and accentuation of cues →

to induce certain responses in others.

Now we turn to ~~crude~~ situations in which
~~the v. important thing is to make~~
~~most~~

commitments of one kind or another are valued
especially highly, and their exact content is ~~valued~~
important.

Self-consciousness: the awareness of
being watched ~~also~~ constricts or guides
behavior, or subjects it to special
check-over procedures to avoid important errors.

Here is an example where no mechanisms
are operating to make embarrassment especially
painful:

lect of

FIVE FAMS: ~~lower-class culture, much less~~ stand-taking.

Filched comb example:

"... Galván walked in combing his hair.
 Lola pounced on him. "Ay, look, this kid's got my
 comb!"
 "Your comb! That's not so. I just took it away from
 Jorge in the courtyard."
 "No wonder I looked for it and couldn't find it. I
 left it on top of the TV ~~xxxxxx~~ yesterday morning."
 Galván threw the comb on the table. "There's your
 filthy old comb!" he said and walked out.
 Lola picked it up. "I'm going to comb Melín's hair.
 The mirror there is larger than the one here. ..." (201)

(& use earlier token promise)

SPEECH MOVES & DOCTRINE

~~Notes~~

Motivated doctrinal moves, as between
China & Russia, Catholic & Episcopal Churches.

In fact there are no examples in the Five Families in which precise and literal commitments are made. But they must be mentioned.

More on ~~remembering~~ & selfconsciousness.

~~As soon as~~ selfconsciousness

Under increased memory conditions, where motivations increase, and payoffs go down for

INSULT

GRAND-THINKING

GAME BETWEEN TWO FELLERS: MAXIMIZING ~~TRUTH~~
DISAGREEMENT while trying to be very general and
clear, and arguing about real things, and, ~~agreed~~
let us say (to make it difficult) ~~a~~ starting out
from various points of agreement.

We may call this a game. What ~~p~~ ^{sentences} ~~paria~~ A can deny depends on
what ~~paria~~ B affirms. Payoff depends partly on what
sentences we ~~now~~ define as admissible and what relations
among them we demand.

~~Drawn~~

Very similar situation if they disagree on some things and
we now tell them to maximize agreement-- without retracting
their views of disagreement, or retracting as few as possible.

This is very like the "commitment" case, where the ~~xxxxxx~~ actor
stands to lose if he takes certain steps, ~~xxxx~~ We can
improve the resemblance quite a bit.

This is a game with a special kind of rule.

whose agreements and disagreements
Note analogy to all arguments/that are motivated, e.g., China
and Russia, Catholic and Episcopal Church.

~~Now what is the motivation for the whole thing?~~
~~admission~~

Okay. This is the foundation for my model of conceptual
thinking.

MODEL OF THINKING. "Ideas" (undefined) are taken two at a
time and compared. There are associated with ideas certain
priorities and qualities (both undefined-- but you're to
get the general idea.) "Priority" means roughly how
important the idea is to you, "quality" ~~may be~~ its truth-
value in your system (but granting different conceptual
modalities of truth, such as "true," "false," "indeterminate,"
"silly," "probable...")

all comparisons poss-- implies etc
When two of these ideas are compared/ ~~and~~ there is apparent
disagreement between them, you may automatically change the
truth-value of one of them, or forget it entirely, or
you may start scanning storage for other relevant ideas.
Depending on your habits of thought.

This subsumes all the laws of logic, yet does not suggest
people usually think logically. ~~not~~ ^{propositionally} ~~And~~ ^{deductively & inductive, & al.}
Allows for mistakes, in comparing, ~~etc.~~ ^{logical} ~~And~~ ^{deductively & inductive, & al.}
~~xxx~~ says there's no cognitive dissonance without attention.

THIS IS A GAME. Unlike logic, it's got a payoff, to wit,
your general comfort and peace of mind, or whatever reinforcement
you're getting.

In this case, you're both the players from the above example--
but you suffer the disadvantage of having to believe whatever
you ~~xxx~~ decide on, so that the ~~more~~ ^{more} ~~xxx~~ ^{likely} more you care about
being right, and the more you know about proper inference,
the more safeguards you have to take, ^{more likely you are to}

~~TWO KINDS COMMITMENT~~

^{try whole restructurings in the face of contradictions?}

ISOMORPHIC,
WILLINGLY.

<sup>Priority, quality & comparison
very over wide
range of quality
types & comparison.</sup>
<sup>GOES HALFWAY on
the most valued
cognition idea.
Likely but not
necessary.</sup>

SCHELLING ON CASUISTRY

From Schelling (p. 34-35)

" Casuistry. If one reaches the point where concession is advisable, he has to recognize two effects: it puts him closer to his opponent's position, and it affects his opponent's estimate of his firmness. Concession not only may be construed as capitulation, it may mark a prior commitment as a fraud, and make the adversary skeptical of any new pretense at commitment. One, therefore, needs an "excuse" for accomodating his opponent, preferably a rationalized reinterpretation of the original commitment, one that is persuasive to the adversary himself.

More interesting is the use of casuistry to release an opponent from a commitment. If one can demonstrate to an opponent that the latter is not committed, or that he has miscalculated his commitment, one may in fact undo or revise the opponent's commitment. ... when the opponent has resolved to make a moderate concession one may help him by proving that he can make a moderate concession consistent with his former position, and that if he does there are no grounds for believing it to reflect on his original principles. "

TX

The

GAME SIMULATION OF COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR, INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR,
INTRAPERSONAL BEHAVIOR,
~~and SOULFUL PHENOMENA in general.~~

Some abstract games as extensional theory; some ~~bridge-games~~
as connectors.

It is not bad manners to bring your pajamas to a dinner party if you do so clearly by accident or as a side effect ~~and not so you will be asked to~~ ~~so it~~ of some other good cause.

Thus with research proposals, when your proposals are supposed to have been in some way derived from ~~to happen~~ or native to a certain body of data. ~~to have~~

In this case, I happen to have brought my theory with me. And if it has not been derived from the data, I believe ~~it is~~ ^{I shall have made} a fair lap around the track if it can show its application to that data, and still depart ~~at~~ what I consider a ~~fair~~ ^{proper} tangent. ~~to~~ to propose research.

(introductory crud)

In some ways this is an extremely rational^{rational} model, though on examination of my idea of cognitive behavior it would be hard to say how. as describing some creatures.

But Freudians would not recognize TA however, for the present purposes ~~Freudian~~ ^{abnormal & everyday psychopathology} theory and ESP are of equal relevance, that is, ~~pro~~ of proven validity in certain cases, but if they apply it's only as even further layers.

This has enough layers already; beginning with a string of ideas, we dip it till it's a very fat candle.



Let us begin by discussing the Schelling theory of
BARGAINING in 2-person non-zero-sum games.



these are situations in which you can behave
 both lose or gain.

Theory is that ~~if~~ you need a means of ex-
 pressing preferences and using actual enticements
 and punishments to back them up.



Let us call these "bargaining channels."
 NEXT P. →



Horrible Example: the Castro family. Only actual threat of a
 strapping slows the boys down. There are no
 means of punishing & rewarding on bit-by-bit fronts
 that the boys will appreciate.

	Story	No story
Shooting		
No shooting		
	Commit.	

	Xmas tree	No Xmas tree
Bothering Cook		
Is NO		
	Commit ✓	

Withholding of affection...

The first kind of

Bargaining-channels, ~~in the present context~~, are those which allow for sequential expression of preference and moves. ~~Let us call these~~

[Quotes from Schelling here]
on actions louder than words]

Let us call these, preference-and-punishment mechanisms — or channels, to suggest a continuity of flow, though not necessarily a permanent patterning.

FIVE FAMILIES: NEED FOR EFFECTIVE MULTILATERAL POWER IN THE
FAMILY UNIT.

*Isabel Castro is unable to effectively translate sexual non-compliance
into a counter for her husband's neglect.*

From Isabel Castro's "thoughts":

"To think that with so much money he is stingy with me! I'll bet he's not like that with his mistress. Fat chance! These damned men refuse their wives what they give their mistresses. ... But I know how to get even with him. When he wants to make up to me I pretend to be asleep and then he's stuck with his desires. And when I let him, I feel no pleasure. It is like holding my nose to take castor oil. I have to get back at him some way. Let him go where he has to pay for it. He only gives me enough for the bare essentials." (319-20)

SCHELLING: ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER.

"... talk is not a substitute for moves. Moves can in some way alter the game, by incurring manifest costs, risks, or a reduced range of subsequent choices; they have an information content, or evidence content, of a different character from that of speech. Talk can be cheap when moves are not (except for the "talk" that takes the form of enforceable threats, promises, commitments, and so forth, and that is to be analyzed under the heading of moves rather than communication anyway.) Mutual accommodation ultimately requires, if the outcome is to be efficient, that the division of gains be in accordance with "comparative advantage"; that is, the things a player concedes should be those that he wants less than the other player, relative to the things he trades for. Each needs, therefore, to communicate his value system with some truth, although each can also gain by deceiving. While one's maneuvers are not unambiguous in their revelation of one's value systems and may even be deliberately deceptive, they nevertheless have an evidential quality that mere speech has not." (117)

SCHELLING on INTERRELATION OF SPEECH AND MOVES.

" Furthermore, if there are moves available to the players, so that it is an advantage to get on with the maneuver even while negotiating, and particularly if some maneuvers become visible to the other player only after a game lag, there is no reason to suppose that an instant

" ... If the moves had only symbolic significance, leaving the game irreversibly different from what it was before, and typically also their tactical significance raises them above the level of pure speech even in their communication content. One may say and say that a gun is loaded without being able to prove it until he actually shoots; one may say and say that he considers an area strategically important and not be believed until he incurs expense or risk in its protection. Thus moves can reveal information about a player's value system or about the choices of action available to him; moves can commit him to certain actions when speech often cannot; and moves can often progress at a speed that is determined unilaterally, not dependent on formalities of agreement at a conference." (101-2) (101-2)

FIVE FAMS: token promises do toward one
who can't retaliate.

PUT IN
2 PLACES

Similarly, ~~we see~~ the ineffectiveness of people
who are ~~dealt~~ powerless in the circumstances of
the family. They must beg for favors, and cannot complain when
the favors are denied.

"Rufelia stood up slowly. "I'm going to bed now,
Julia. Ay, please let me have a scrap of blanket. That
room is so cold! Man! Toward morning is when I feel
it most. Come over later and throw another blanket over
me. Don't be so mean, daughter."

"Yes, mamacita, I'll send one of the children later."
When Rufelia had gone Julia began to pile the dirty dishes
into a basin. x ..."

(201)

The next ^{channel} ~~bargaining model~~ is that of the commitment. In Schelling's model, the point is to restructure another man's payoff so that his old move the one he would have wanted to make, is now less pleasant. Typically, in the more crystalline example, ~~such moves are accomplished~~ one ~~by~~ demonstrating^{ing} that ~~his opponent~~ ~~he is~~ he has incentive to visit punishment on a misbehaving opponent. But off the matrix, it is necessary only to be convincing at this.

The best example of this is in the Sanchez family. Jesús Sanchez has complete power over ~~his~~ his money and chattels, ~~and his threat~~ ^{and} ~~often alluded to~~ ^{and there lurks} always in the background the unstated threat that he will throw out ~~the few~~ ^{wholly credible} members of the family who do not accede to his wishes. Everyone therefore gives in completely.

The only person who does not stand in this fear is his daughter Antonia.

DEFERENCE

FIVE FAM'S:

JESUS SANCHEZ has complete power over money and chattels because his threat of throwing out dissidents is so credible.

Everybody else therefore gotta give in completely.
(But in my theory doesn't that mean they ~~gt~~ relax better, have less trouble?)

But ANTONIA need not fear Jesus because her threat of illness, unstated, is so credible. Same thing binds her to her husband, however.

" ... Antonia had not feared being punished by her father, for he was afraid of causing one of her attacks. Jesus had beaten her severely because of an earlier affair but he knew that when she quarreled with Francisco or did not see him she stopped eating. He had to yield and consent to their union. " (240)

" For a long time, Antonia had taken for granted everything her father did for her. If he did not satisfy her whims she would grow angry and shout at him. She wanted better clothes than her sisters, and got them. All her sisters were jealous. According to Marta her father let Antonia have her own way in everything. "He loved her best and he gave her the life of a queen. I think it was because he had once abandoned her. She used her illness to frighten my poor father into giving her everything she wanted. Nobody could do anything with her but Francisco. As soon as he came over to grab her she would calm down. She was a first-class bitch." " (243)

But ~~not~~ these things curl around in funny ways. She is bound to her husband by the same mechanism, an implied threat that something will happen to him.

A good threat, to deter or compel, must be creditable. Witness this sequence, in which an ad-hoc threat is challenged by the child and effectively dissipated.

Ad-hoc & incredible steps.

FIVE FAMILIES: temper-times and ~~ad-hoc bargaining~~. Retreat by the mother, because her payoffs are in same pot.

(Isabel, Rolando and Lourdes Castro, in car.)

"What did you say?" his mother asked, ready to flare up again.

"Nothing. I didn't say anything."

"Yes, mamá," said Lourdes. "He was grumbling."

"Shut up, you brat, or I'm going to hit you."

"Look, if you don't keep quiet I'll go home and there'll be no tree or anything." It's up to you." Isabel stopped the car.

"No, mamá," Lourdes said conciliatingly. "We're going to keep quiet, aren't we?" Rolando stubbornly said nothing.

"All right," Isabel said, "I'm telling you. At the first word we'll go home." The children were quiet while she drove through the city's traffic, which was very heavy at this time of day. ~~While she was driving~~

While

~~Here it would seem that Isabel is backing down from a threat threat, made explicitly~~
~~when she~~ stopped the car, she did not carry through the threat nor attempt to salvage it, which will undermine her threats in the future.
certainly

FIVE FAMS: Guillermo is such a flappy clown ~~xxxx~~ that nobody can take him seriously.

" Guillermo had put on his hat, lifted the heavy sack of bottles over his shoulder, and was ready to go out! "I'm going ~~to~~ to deliver this," he said to his wife, "because if I don't go now then maybe tomorrow she won't want it. You know, a sale can't be made just any time from one minute to another. If this bunch is sold then I can begin to make that lottery game and then you'll see how the money rolls in! Damned if I won't rake in the wool!"

Julia was whispering with Yolanda and didn't answer. Guillermo went a little closer to them and raised his voice, "I told you something. If you don't want to believe me, then don't believe me." The women went on talking and Guillermo tried to hear what they were saying. ... " (195)

It is impossible to have a bargaining-personality of any strength when you are so clearly distractable from ~~any~~ a pompous thing you do; at least within the spectrum of known usual personalities, it would be an unlikely expectation to form.

However, this is a specific statement contingent less on the form of the game than of special applications of it to the usual run of people and situations, in which ~~xxxx~~ particulars we do not wish to become absorbed.

Let us note how the curious position of
~~affected~~^{emotional} behavior. the "emotional" act
— fist slammed on table, scream, etc. —
can serve quite well to authenticate
a threat. ~~to~~

FIVE FAMS: FORGIVENESS THROUGH FORGETFULNESS.

Consuelo's
Consuelo forgives Antonia. / Adolescence full of jealousy, 249.

"They hadn't often gone anywhere together for their present friendship was recent." (248)

the theory that has been presented
let me recapitulate ~~what I have said so far, and~~

~~the theory~~

so far. For best accommodation between people, bargaining channels are needed so that each may keep his fellows in check. These channels provide opportunity for preference signals, some encouragement ~~and~~ ^{and} punishment, on a non-verbal level. In addition, bargaining also ~~requires~~ ^{needs} commitment, in which an individual can mortgage his reputation, ^{tie his own hands,} narrow his control; ... in various ways gain control of the competitive situation and dictate the outcome. These commitments, ~~are~~ of people and seen by people, enable a greater firmness and bargaining strength than is otherwise possible, ~~in return~~ at the cost of some freedoms.

~~Other human traits may~~

Human traits may take on ~~an~~ extra signal-value, ~~that they would not have for people who~~ have. The expression of emotion, many other actions may come to take on a strategic or ~~technical~~ tactical aspect at a new level. ~~This extent~~ Hurt feelings, rigging of the situation. forgetting and remembering.

NEXT

Section

~~REMEMBERING~~ thickens the pile considerably

NEXT

Section

This is a theory about SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

There can be two watchers in self-consciousness: yourself, and another. If nobody's watching you except yourself, that's different from when somebody else is too.

A very long list ~~xxxxxx~~ can be made of things which you may or may (not) want to reveal. Such as:

PAYOFFS

TRAITS

MOTIVES, CONSIDERATION-BASE... INTENTION !

REACTIONS

Possessions, relations, abilities... ('environmental'; that is, sort of out of the game.)

LIKE A COMPUTER PROGRAM in that no part of your world is not open to scrutiny in the game, just as ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ all information in the computer may be manipulated.

The nature of secrecy and accidental revelation is very tricky. once it becomes clear that you are hiding something, this fact -- even if it does not fully reveal what you are hiding -- indicates that you are motivated to ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{hide something} that's negative payoff could be involved somewhere...

Hence the structure of the situation-- what things are naturally visible-- becomes extremely important for the things it naturally hides and brings to light.

ATTENTION as a fact about human functioning, and CONSIDERATION ditto, also may be used as parts of the game, because they are known to have certain properties.

(Ftnt.

HOWEVER, they may be removed from the game by organization, too.

This if you make it mandatory that certain things be ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ^{to} given attention, as (in an organization) by punishing when not, or (in conversation, etc.) ~~xxxxxxxx~~ demanding acknowledgement, or (as in a magic show) making them conspicuous in retrospect, so the beholder cannot say to himself, "It must have been thus-and-such, because I wasn't watching that"-- this theory is implausible if you did look in the hat before the rabbit appeared, and so this cause of the magician's trick is ruled out. In just the same way we manipulate interpretations of our actions by manipulating the attentions of the beholder-- though subtlety ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ may count more, since we may not, like the magician, seek to prevent understanding, but rather to force an interpretation, the way he forces a card.)

Probably not using.

NOPs

The Logic-program.

Thinking does not always proceed logically, or in a way that can be expressed by the usual logical notations. Hence we ask: is there a representation we can make of the contents of thought? I will talk here of 'ideas,' by that term comprehending everything from ~~image~~ attitudes to Boolean propositions.

~~I think so, and I ought to have the following properties~~

If so, the system ought to be able to cover the following.

- a) A large
1. ~~The whole~~ range of precision, from perhaps the roughest ontological presentation of an image or ^{connection} to a finely honed philosophical argument.
- b) ~~change of explicitness~~
2. The ~~explicit~~ vague can become explicit and vice versa, as when an ~~opinion~~ attitude becomes an opinion, or an opinion loses sharpness and colors others.
2. ~~Other~~ changes

3. INCONSISTENCIES CAN BE CORRECTED.

- A. They may not be noticed
- ~~B. The content of a be~~

NO p

ATTENTION & CONSIDERATION
operationally defined

~~Assoc~~

Recreate

~~Correspond~~

Distinguish

Deny

Generalize

ATTENTION

SELF CONSCIOUSNESS

without which can't have

REASONING

COMMITMENT

The STRATEGICS of SECRECY are hence ~~more~~ complicated.

Given a secret, A.

Not only may you wish it to be a secret. You may also want

"A is a secret" to be a secret.

You may wish to reveal something, and have it seem to be accidentally revealed.

The possibility of ACCIDENTAL REVELATION must therefore exist, (*or you must believe the other fellow believes it exists.)

STAND-TAKING

↑ only imp. when ~~it~~ ATTENTION.

CONSISTENCY → EXPLANATION

TRAIT " → APPARENT expl.

SCHELLING-GAME

"Neither player knows the other player's value system-- or perhaps knows just a little about it, such as what elements matter but not how much they matter. Each must learn what he can about the other's value system by observing the other player's moves." ~~91~~ (103)







HE SAYS HIS GAME WORKS THIS ~~WAY~~ WAY:

"Now how do the players "bargain" in this game? One way or another, they do in fact make proposals and counterproposals; they accept, reject, retaliate, and even discover ways of conveying threats and promises. ..."

WE SEEM TO "JUSTIFY" WHAT WE LIKE TO DO ANYWAY.

" Guillermo sat up to dress. He was wearing a soiled T shirt and shorts made of coarse sacking. Over these he pulled on a pair of thoroughly dirty cotton trousers and then pushed his feet into his old shoes. He never tied his shoelaces, even when he wore his better pair downtown, because he believed his shoes lasted longer this way. "If I tie them they get tight and then when I sit down the shoes bust on me." Sometimes Julia complained of his unshaven, dishevelled appearance and ragged clothing, but he would answer that it was better to go about looking poor so that people would repay what they owed him. " (138)

ABSTRACT DOCTRINE GAME I



Handwritten text at the top of the page, possibly a title or header, which is mostly illegible due to fading.




ABSTRACT DOCTRINE GAME II

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) ... (scrabble set)
(has both numbers and letters)

ABSTRACT DOCTRINE GAME III


COLORS MARKERS. YOU CAN PUT ON
OR TAKE OFF. IDEA IS

TO FOOL
GUYS
AS TO
WHERE
YOU'RE
PUTTING
THINGS.



ABSTRACT DOCTRINE IV

Schelling-game ~~is~~ (let 'punishment' be
'contradiction?')



ABSTRACTION area. SOMEHOW.

permits you to come back to the old game
with a conspicuously CHANGED FRAME OF
REFERENCE, and BREAK DOCTRINAL BIND.

DOCTRINE - GAME, V

~~Either the twags are all spingrid,~~
~~or they are not.~~
~~No twags are spingrid~~
~~...~~
~~elfin~~

Are nymphs elves?

Trolls, satyrs, gnomes, leprechauns, norns,
witches, fairies,

Other (unused) categories.

MUST NAME ALL THE CATEGORIES & ADJS.
BEFOREHAND.

LECTURE - GAME V

~~For the most part, the
game is not very
interesting and
the players are
not very good.~~

The players are
not very good, and
the game is not
very interesting.

It is a very
interesting game.

It is a very
interesting game.
The players are
not very good.

Schelling-Theory

Payoffs, revelation.

Threat etc. as combination - bargaining

STRUCTURED SITUATIONS are the thing to satisfy/dissatisfy
everybody.
CONSPICUOUS SOLUTIONS, compact games...

My additions=

These are how people behave interpersonally.

+ For self-conscious ^{explicit} people
Cognitive behavior is another aspect of it; and varies
from complete 'integrity' to 'subjugation' to motives (etc.)

Distraction & ~~reorientation~~ attentional behavior &
shifts of emphasis permit enormous reorientation
of the situation. ~~only extra-consideration~~

~~keeps the situation from degenerating (etc.)~~

~~so that~~ you ~~don't~~ ^{may} accidentally lose ground.

Extra-consideration must be constantly applied
to prevent this, when possible (as to keep
new-choices transitive.)

Payoff from liquidity of situation may keep alter from
trouncing on you thus.

The ^{interpersonal} ~~social~~ manifold has few pure cases, without doctrine. Fights & games, usually; Challenges & market behavior. ^(But that's not exactly 'interpersonal') Action & payoff; strict game theory; v.N. & M., Schelling.

But where any ~~statement~~ statements or generalities are implied or suggested — for instance, by "I love you" — then it's a new case.

The other pure case is just as rare. It is approached by philosophers etc. This is 'doctrine.' I don't know why.
DOCTRINE OVERT, COGNITION PRIVATE.


THIS DOMAIN IS THE GAME - ~~DOCTRINE~~ COGNITION DOMAIN!

ONE UNIQUE PROPERTY: Actions ^{& other human revelations} suggest, confirm & disconfirm cognitive stuff.

INTERESTING GAME

Three-person game, illustrating a situational bind, of a kind.

A and B are dickering but C is watching. Analogue: flirting in front of your wife in ways she can see, and in ways she can't.



	C1	C2
A1		
A2		
A3		
A4		

Moral: if there's a way to prove accession, you'll accede - otherwise not (Schelling.)

Hypothesis: that much of interpersonal gumhucking is for the setting-up or destruction of such mechanisms.

PSYCHOLOGY OF ACADEMIC PERSUASION

It is possible that the description of the game has some plausibility to a new audience, i.e., it points up things that have not been thought of before.

However, this is not much different from other common-sense grounds which generally present ~~themselves~~ themselves for theory.

someone

Like ~~a small boy~~ *someone* who had seen many people playing Parcheesi in his life, but only just now come to understand the game.

The hardbitten academic consumer looks for more, though. Either typical signs, ~~or~~ like statistics of validation, or some compelling evidence.

QUICK RUNDOWN OF THE SCHELLING*THEORY I'M PRESENTING.
AND MY PHYSIOGNOMIC ADDITIONS.

Through ~~the various ways~~ there being different people,
there are different interests.

~~Through~~

To handle these interests there are many devices.
(Excluding altruisms etc., which are far too complicated to
mention.) EXPRESSION OF PREFERENCES, THREATS, PROMISES, ETC.

For there to be rational ~~human~~ acceptance of these, there
must be AUTHENTICATION.

Authentication depends on the properties of the systems
used. In military science, for instance, a country that
seeks to make its attack systems convincing will show the
decision-processes and mechanisms it possesses clearly.
Assuming that it has the hardware it wants to seem to have.
It might be, on the other hand, that it has to fake.
Okay.

Point is that I want to say these things take place
in everyday life to an extent unsuspected. ~~and~~

They must use other channels than mere words. Threats
lose their ring quickly by being mildly tested and found
untrue, same with promises, etc.

Man does not live by words alone, or love, etc. It
gotta be through large number of ~~xxx~~ communications and
punishment-reward tricks, to keep others in line and informed
as to your needs on a subtle level.

MUST BE COMBINATION OF ACTS AND WORDS.

Having "acts" has a further set of functions:

1. DISJUNCTIVE INTERPRETATION-- can fudge, act as if that's
not what was meant.
2. Looked onto the nature of human reactions ~~xxx~~ of the naive
level-- they have to be real in some sense, nearly always.

THEORY

*This is the
scope of
generalized
bargain theory.*

THE PAPER AS SHE WILL BE WROTE.

DOCTRINE
INTERPERSONAL BARGAINING/AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS:
A proposal for simulation-games and bridge-games.

"FIVE FAMILIES" PART
THEORY PART:

Bargaining takes place between people. Schelling theory will be used.

(OMITTED: considerations of trait consistency. OAM of cue satisfaction. INTRAPERSONAL bargaining in cognition and emotional commitment. Intrapersonal doctrino-emotional problems: apathy, existentialist bind. Attention and cognition as shifting the bargain-board.)

Schelling:

Moves on all fronts: the mixture of games, hitting one another. Undependability of words, use of action to show payoff. Variation of communication channels determining possibilities. Conspicuousness of solutions as helping ~~xxxxxxxx~~ determine them. Commitment as side-bet, or anyhow a deal in which you're made to keep coming.

Nelson:

Doctrinal (stated, not what you really think, but what you say) moves are also moves.

BINDS. ~~xxxxxxxx~~ simple commitmental, doctrinal.

THE TEACHER who keeps certain channels open and forces compliance. Likewise Communist Chinese, in their prison camps.

THE GAMES

THE BRIDGE-GAMES

CURIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY of the bridge-games.


Other things:

BE CERTAIN TO USE THE BRUNER-GAME.

Outline

Five Families as a springboard.

Outright bargaining Ineffectiveness for desires: money, sex.



Preface to the games. On extensional Theory & bridge-games.

The Games.

THE BRIDGE GAMES. Scripts: seduction, doctrinal ^{split w. subsequent} merging. (CAN BE DONE PARTLY WITH PRINTED SLIPS.)
Deciding to like Picasso.

Other possible metrics of game-moves. Do they come naturally? 'Acculturation bind' — maybe club membership + previous national pride ... kids' experiment, ~~valentine~~ day: have ~~pho~~ phony party for phony holiday, which involves kissing-games & doctrine & adults' listening to doctrine (plus kids' embarrassment ~~over~~ but eagerness to kiss.) Ambiguous rules subject to varying interpretation. Bargaining.

APPENDICES.

1. Conceptual thinking
2. Internal accounting
3. The ~~Great Game (?)~~ SRC game.

Schelling

GAMES, BARGAINING, TOPOGRAPHY (consciousness),
SITUATIONS STRUCTURE (rearrangement of payoffs), DANGERS
(making punishment danger.)

Nelson
cognitive ops.

IDEAS, PROPOSITIONS, WAYS OF MAKING THEM
COME OUT SOME SPECIAL WAY. (in payoff situations.)

Nelson.

BOTH COMBINED. Doctrinal commitment.
Doctrinal differentiation, reconciliation. Doctrinal moves
& bring payoff, both in the one-person and two-person
situation.

Mother

Fucker.

Schelling
interpersonally

All moves (+ THEIR COGNITIVE IMPLICATIONS) at once*
take on significance re consideration, attention, prospect
characteristics of the actors. INCIDENTALS of world & situation.
THIS IS THE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF MAKING SCHEMING INTERPERSONAL.

*given self-consciousness and attentiveness to this sort of thing.

THIS WOULD BE ENOUGH FOR MANY CASES.

But must add now

BALL GAME

DOCTRINE + INTERPERSONAL.

Postulates of emotional commitment.

1) Harder you work, more you'll want it (etc.) 2) In far case, you control this directly.

FIVE FAMILIES: VALUE OF SIGNAL CONSISTENCY

Jesús Sánchez always knocks three times. Shows one function of his stern regularity.

" A second time that day they heard three knocks on the front door and again Lupita recognized them and went quickly to open the door without pausing to ask who was there. She slid back the bolt and Jesús walked in. " (281)

✓ BARGAINING-CHANNELS. Only strap works.

✓ ~~Withdrawal of affection~~
The Castros. That mother who's cold.

✓ DETERRENCE & THREAT.

Sánchez home.

✓ TRAIT PLAUSIBILITY.

Guillermo Gutiérrez.

SELFCONSCIOUSNESS: HOW IMPORTANT IS COMMITMENT?

Comb (Gutiérrez)

✓ ATTENTION, FORGETFULNESS AS ~~USED~~ REAL ATTRIBUTES
USED TO SIGNAL.

(Sánchez sisters.) (* token promise)

Commitment
by words

→ SPEECH ↔ MOVES

→ INSULT & forced response

→ situational rigging to avoid commitments... (avoid doel...)

→ Doctrinal argument

INTERNAL ACCOUNTING & PROCEDURE

Jesús Sánchez.

If affection etc. are not part of internal-accounting system,
then the subtlety of bargain-channels that involve affection
and sense of psychic withdrawal have no effect, &
others must be used. (Castros.)

DOCTRINAL reprise, involving internal stuff.

COGNITIVE BEHAVIOR as successive comparisons, whose outcome
is motivated, and all parts of which are very flexible.

INTERNAL BARGAINING - everyday examples... Self-justification (Guillermo)

FALLING IN LOVE...

TEMPTATION

GRATIFICATIONAL COMMITMENT

EMOTIONAL COMMITMENT

→ EXISTENTIALISM.

SOULFUL: DOCTRINAL-EMOTIONAL
STUFF AND

PROPOSALS NOT BEING MADE

BECAUSE: 1) I want most global

2) I wanna get at features of game.

GAMES.
What they'd show?
egotism; physiological egotism.

BRIDGE-GAME

objectivity requires by abstraction.

BARG
FIVE FAMS: A "tantrum" as expression & registration of offense
without harmful consequences. x2

Antonia spoke up, "Why don't you give some to me?"

"Oh, take it, take it, child! Caray!" Marielena said
angrily. "Tonia you are like a schoolgirl. Everything is
a joke to you, and no one knows when you're serious."

"Oh, you bitter child!" Antonia answered. "What do
you know about life?"

CHALLENGE & RESPONSE.

Can have model that's strictly categorical,
wherein you commit yourself automatically
to future traits.

~~Can be~~

Next layer: where these commitments are
themselves objects of ~~self~~ scrutiny,
and hence the self-consciousness
~~builds~~ ^{is what makes} the commitment.

CHARGE 2 RESERVE

Can have used the first category
when no more second category
is left.

~~OK for the~~

Not later than the month of
transfer of the property
and since the property
is in the hands of the
transferor.



200P: Usep & Unusid

[200P with a comma in Sec Rd]

